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ABSTRACT
First proposed by Wang and Li in 2007, workflow resiliency is a
policy analysis for ensuring that, even when an adversarial envi-
ronment removes a subset of workers from service, a workflow
can still be instantiated to satisfy all the security constraints. Wang
and Li proposed three notions of workflow resiliency: static, decre-
mental, and dynamic resiliency. While decremental and dynamic
resiliency are bothPSPACE-complete,Wang and Li did not provide
a matching lower and upper bound for the complexity of static re-
siliency.
The present work begins with proving that static resiliency is
Π
p
2 -complete, thereby bridging a long-standing complexity gap in
the literature. In addition, a fourth notion of workflow resiliency,
one-shot resiliency, is proposed and shown to remain in the third
level of the polynomial hierarchy. This shows that sophisticated
notions ofworkflow resiliency need not bePSPACE-complete. Lastly,
we demonstrate how to reduce static and one-shot resiliency toAn-
swer Set Programming (ASP), amodern constraint-solving technol-
ogy that can be used for solving reasoning tasks in the lower levels
of the polynomial hierarchy. In summary, this work demonstrates
the value of focusing on notions of workflow resiliency that reside
in the lower levels of the polynomial hierarchy.
1 INTRODUCTION
Confidentiality, integrity, and availability are three essential goals
of security. This paper is about availability considerations in work-
flow authorization models.
A workflow is an application-level abstraction of a business pro-
cess. Access control in a workflow application is captured in a
workflow authorization model [1, 3, 7, 37, 38], the main idea of
which is to realize the Principle of Least Privilege [35] through per-
mission abstraction [2]. Instead of granting permissions directly to
users, permissions are granted to the steps of a workflow. When
a user is assigned to perform a step in the workflow, the permis-
sions are then made available to the user. Two additional access
control features are typically found in a workflow authorization
model. First, qualification requirements can be imposed on each
workflow step. An example is to require that the “Prepare Budget”
step be carried out by an “Account Clerk,” while the “Account Re-
view” step be carried out by an “Account Manager” (example taken
from [40]). This is typically framed in terms of roles in an under-
lying Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) model. Second, further
security constraints may be imposed across steps to prevent abuse.
A classical example would be separation-of-duty constraints: e.g.,
the “Create Payment” step and the “Approve Payment” step must
be carried out by two distinct users (example taken from [15]). Re-
cent works in workflow authorization models have considered ar-
bitrary binary constraints, thereby introducing into workflow au-
thorization models an element of Relationship-Based Access Con-
trol (ReBAC) [25, 39, 40].
As permissions are now encapsulated in workflow steps, we
want to make sure that the workflow can actually be executed, or
else the situation amounts to a denial of service. In other words,
one must ensure that it is possible to assign users to workflow
steps, so that all qualification requirements and security constraints
are satisfied. This notion of availability has been known in the liter-
ature as theworkflow satisfiability problem (WSP) [3, 7, 15, 40].
WSP can be used as a policy analysis to help the workflow devel-
oper debug her formulation, so that the latter is not overly con-
strained.
A major landmark in the study of the WSP has been the work
of Wang and Li [39, 40], who first introduced into the literature
the application of Fixed Parameter Tractable (FPT) algorithms [21]
to solve WSP. Subsequently, major breakthroughs in the design of
FPT algorithms forWSP have been invented by the research group
at Royal Holloway University of London, including kernelization
algorithms [8, 14, 15], exploitation of problem symmetry in pattern-
based algorithms [5, 6], and novel problem formulations [9, 12],
A second major contribution of Wang and Li’s work is the in-
troduction of an advanced notion of availability that is stronger
than workflow satisfiability. That notion is workflow resiliency
[39, 40], the subject of this paper. The idea is to anticipate catastro-
phes that may remove users from service. One would like to ensure
that, even if the adversarial environment has taken away a certain
number of users, the workflow is still satisfiable by the remaining
personnel. More specifically,Wang and Li proposed three different
notions of workflow resiliency, namely, static, decremental, and dy-
namic resiliency. While decremental and dynamic resiliency have
been shown to be PSPACE-complete, Wang and Li did not provide
a matching upper and lower bound for the complexity of static re-
siliency: static resiliency is in Π
p
2 and is NP-hard. Whether static
resiliency is Π
p
2 -complete has remained an open problem since the
notion was first conceived a decade ago. Bridging this complexity
gap is the first motivation of this work.
The last few years have witnessed a renewed interest in the
study of workflow resiliency [10, 29–31]. Two lines of research
have been representative. The first is the work of Mace et al. [29–
31], who argue that it is more important to assess to what (quanti-
tative) degree of resiliency a workflow enjoys, rather than to test if
the workflow is resilient or not (binary). The goal is to offer guid-
ance to the workflow developer in terms of refining the formula-
tion of the business process.
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While Mace et al.’s approach is valuable, it is the position of this
paper that deep insights of the workflow can be gained by evalu-
ating the workflow against multiple and incomparable notions of
workflow resiliency: e.g., statically resilient for a budget of t1 and
decrementally resilient for a budget of t2, where t2 < t1. In fact,
each notion of workflow resiliency captures a family of attack sce-
narios. Confirming that a workflow is resilient in terms of several
incomparable notions of resiliency offers deep insight into the for-
mulation of the workflow. We therefore need a good number of
notions of workflow resiliency, rather than just a few. More than
that, we need notions of workflow resiliency that are not compu-
tationally prohibitive to test. Unfortunately, a pessimistic reader
of Wang and Li may come to the (unwarranted) conclusion that
static resiliency is an exception rather than a rule, and that most
notions of workflow resiliency are PSPACE-complete. This pes-
simism is understandable as the notions ofworkflow resiliency pro-
posed by Wang and Li are formulated in terms of strategic games.
If resiliency is fundamentally a PSPACE-complete phenomenon,
then hoping for an efficient solution may be unrealistic. A second
motivation of this work is to demonstrate that there are indeed
useful notions of workflow resiliency that are not as prohibitive as
decremental and dynamic resiliency.
A second line of recent work in workflow resiliency is that of
Crampton et al. [10],who devised a first FPT algorithm for deciding
dynamic resiliency. The parameter they used was k + t , where k is
the number of steps in the workflow, and t is the number of users
that the adversary can remove. While k is universally accepted to
be a small parameter in the literature [15, 40], t is not. For example,
if t is a fixed fraction of the number of users (e.g., 5% of the user
population), it already grows much faster than is acceptable for an
FPT algorithm. It is the position of this paper that parameterizing
the problem using t is not fruitful (see §8, however, for an example
of adversary models in which such a parameterization could make
sense). In this light, non-FPT approaches are still valuable when t
is not a small parameter. The formulation of algorithmic solutions
for workflow resiliency without assuming a small t is the third
motivation of this work.
This paper has three contributions:
(1) In §3, static resiliency is proven to be Π
p
2 -complete, thereby
bridging the long-standing complexity gap in the work of
Wang and Li [39, 40]. This result also provides the intellec-
tual justification for the third contribution below.
(2) In §4, we dispel the pessimistic interpretation of Wang and
Li’s work by formulating a new notion ofworkflow resiliency,
one-shot resiliency, which is more sophisticated than static
resiliency, and nevertheless remains in the third level of the
polynomial hierarchy (Σ
p
3 -complete). This means that use-
ful notions of workflow resiliency can be formulated with-
out flirting with PSPACE-completeness.
(3) We advocate the use of Answer Set Programming (ASP) [22,
23], a modern constraint-solving technology, for deciding
static and one-shot resiliency. ASP has been shown to be
particularly fitted for reasoning problems in the lower levels
of the polynomial hierarchy [4, 19, 20, 34]. In §6, we demon-
strate the feasibility of this approach by presenting ASP en-
codings of static and one-shot resiliency. These reductions
employ an encoding technique known as the model satu-
ration technique [19, 20]. This solution approach does not
require the parameter t to be small.
2 BACKGROUND: WORKFLOW
SATISFIABILITY AND RESILIENCY
This section provides a brief introduction toworkflow satisfiability
and resiliency, in order to prepare the reader to understand the
rest of this paper. All the materials presented in this section have
already appeared in previous work (particularly [39, 40]).
2.1 Workflow Satisfiability
A workflow is the abstract representation of a business process.
Definition 2.1. A workflow (S, ) is a partial ordering of steps.
For steps s1, s2 ∈ S , we write s1 ≺ s2 whenever s1  s2 but s1 , s2.
Steps are tasks to be executed by users, and the partial ordering
expresses the causal dependencies among steps. If two steps are
ordered by ≺, then they must be executed in that order; otherwise,
they can interleave in any arbitrary manner.
When a workflow is executed, users are assigned to the steps,
sometimes in an incremental manner.
Definition 2.2. Given a workflow (S, ) and a set U of users, a
partial plan is a function θ : T → U such that (a)T ⊆ S , and (b) θ
is causally closed: that is, for s1, s2 ∈ S , if s1 ∈ T and s2 ≺ s1, then
s2 ∈ T . A partial plan θ is also called a plan when dom(θ) = S .
Security constraints, such as seperation of duty,may be imposed
on a workflow in order to prevent abuse.
Definition 2.3 (in the style of [5, 6]). Aworkflow authorization
policy W is a 5-tuple (S, ,U ,A,C), where the components are
defined as follows:
• (S, ) is a workflow.
• U is a set of users.
• A ⊆ S × U is the step authorization policy, which lists
for each step those users who are qualified to carry out the
step.
• C is a set of constraints. Each constraint has the form (T ,Θ).
The set T ⊆ S specifies the steps constrained by the con-
straint. The component Θ is a set of partial plans, each with
T as its domain. The set Θ specifies the combinations of as-
signments that are permitted by the constraint.
The following definition specifies when a (partial) plan satisfies
the requirements imposed by a workflow authorization policy.
Definition 2.4. Suppose θ is a partial plan for the workflow au-
thorization policyW = (S, ,U ,A,C). We say that θ is valid if and
only if the following conditions hold:
• For every step s ∈ S , (s,θ(s)) ∈ A.
• For every constraint (T ,Θ) ∈ C , if T ⊆ dom(θ), then there
exists θ ′ ∈ Θ such that for every s ∈ T , θ(s) = θ(s)′.
A plan is valid if and only if it is valid as a partial plan.
The following are some examples of constraints. Following [39,
40], we focus mostly on entailment constraints, including the gen-
eralization by [14, 15]. Our ASP encodings of §6 can easily handle
the cardinality constraints of [14, 15] as well.
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Example 2.5. Suppose S is a set of steps, and U is a set of users.
• Suppose S1 and S2 are non-empty subsets of S , and ρ ⊆ U ×
U is a binary relation. We write ent(ρ, S1, S2) to denote the
entailment constraint (T ,Θ) for which T = T1 ∪ T2, and
Θ = {θ ∈ UT | ∃s1 ∈ T1, s2 ∈ T2 . (θ(s1),θ(s2)) ∈ ρ}.
• Crampton et al. classify entailment constraints in to vari-
ous types [14, 15]. A type-1 entailment constraint is one
in which both step sets are singleton sets. We overload no-
tation and write ent(ρ, s1, s2) to denote ent(ρ, {s1}, {s2}). A
type-2 entailment constraint is one in which exactly one of
the two step sets is a singleton set. A type-3 entailment con-
straint is one in which neither of the step sets is a singleton
set.
• The separation-of-duty constraint sod(s1, s2) is the type-
1 entailment constraint ent(,, s1, s2). Similarly, thebinding-
of-duty constraint bod(s1, s2) is defined to be ent(=, s1, s2).
When one formulates aworkflow authorization policy, onemust
ensure that the constraints are not overly restrictive to the point
that no valid plan exists.
Definition 2.6. A workflow authorization policy W is satisfi-
able if and only if at least one valid plan exists.WSP is the language
of workflow authorization policies that are satisfiable.
Theorem 2.7 ([39, 40]). WSP is NP-complete.
Even thoughWSP is theoretically intractable, previous work has
demonstrated that it can be decidedwithmoderate efficiency by ap-
ply modern SAT solving technologies [40], and with even greater
efficiency by Fixed-Parameter Tractable algorithms [5, 6, 15, 40].
2.2 Workflow Resiliency
Formission critical business processes, a degree of availability higher
than workflow satisfiability is often desired. The basic idea is to
anticipate catastrophic events, which may render some users un-
available for duty. The goal is to ensure that there is enough re-
dundancy in human resources so that the workflow can execute to
completion even when accidents occur.
The first notion of workflow resiliency models a workflow that
runs for a very short period of time (e.g., in minutes). Some users
become unavailable prior to workflow execution. Due to the short
duration of the workflow, no further users are removed from ser-
vice.
Definition 2.8 (Static Resiliency [39, 40]). A workflow authoriza-
tion policyW = (S, ,U ,A,C) is statically resilient for an integer
budget t ≥ 0 if and only if, for every subset ∆ of U that has size t
or less, there is a valid plan θ : S → (U \ ∆) that does not assign
the users in ∆.
Workflow resiliency is typically described in terms of two-person
games: Player 1 attempts to construct a valid plan, while Player 2,
who models the adversarial environment, counters Player 1 by re-
moving users from service. Static resiliency can thus be modelled
by a two-person game that is played in one round: Player 2 first re-
moves up to t users, and then Player 1 constructs a valid plan with
the remaining users. A workflow authorization policy is statically
resilient when Player 1 can win no matter how Player 2 plays.
The next notion of workflow resiliency models the situation in
which the workflow runs for a moderately long time (e.g., within a
day). During the execution of the workflow, more and more users
become unavailable.
Definition 2.9 (Decremental Resiliency [39, 40]). A workflow au-
thorization policyW = (S, ,U ,A,C) is decrementally resilient
for integer budget t ≥ 0 if and only if Player 1 can win the decre-
mental resiliency game no matter how Player 2 plays.
The decremental resiliency game is a two-player game that pro-
ceeds in rounds. At any time, the configuration of the game is a
pair (∆,θ), where ∆ ⊆ U , and θ is a partial plan. In the initial con-
figuration, both ∆ and θ are ∅.
Each round begins by Player 2 choosing some users from U to
be added to ∆, so long as |∆| ≤ t . (A legitimate special case is
when no user is chosen. Also, users added to ∆ remain there until
the end of the game.) Next, Player 1 extends θ by assigning a user
fromU \ ∆ to a not-yet-assigned step.
Player 2wins right away ifU \∆ becomes empty, or if θ becomes
invalid. Player 1 wins if θ is eventually turned into a valid plan (i.e.,
every step is assigned a user).
The third notion of workflow resiliency models situations in
which the workflow runs for an extended period of time (e.g., in
days). Once an accident occurs to remove some users from service,
they return to work before the next accident has a chance to occur.
Definition 2.10 (Dynamic resiliency [39, 40]). A workflow autho-
rization policyW = (S, ,U ,A,C) is dynamically resilient for
integer budget t ≥ 0 if and only if Player 1 can win the dynamic
resiliency game no matter how Player 2 plays.
The dynamic resiliency game is a two-player game that pro-
ceeds in rounds. At any time, the configuration of the game is a
partial plan θ . Initially, θ is ∅.
Each round begins by Player 2 choosing a subset ∆ of U such
that |∆| ≤ t . Next, Player 1 extends θ by assigning a member of
U \ ∆ to a not-yet-assigned step.
Player 2wins right away if∆ = U , or ifθ becomes invalid. Player
1 wins if θ is eventually turned into a valid plan.
We write SRCP for the language of pairs (W , t) for which W
is statically resilient for a budget t . Similarly, we write CRCP and
DRCP for the respective language of decremental and dynamic re-
siliency.
The three notions of resiliency are totally ordered in terms of
how demanding they are.
Theorem 2.11 ([39, 40]). DRCP ⊂ CRCP ⊂ SRCP.
Note the proper set inclusion in the statement above. While
SRCP is the least demanding notion of resiliency among the three,
its computational complexity is also the least intimidating.
Theorem 2.12 ([39, 40]). DRCP and CRCP are PSPACE-complete.
SRCP is in Π
p
2 , and is NP-hard.
Note that the upper and lower bound for SRCP do not match.
Since the publication ofWang and Li’s works a decade ago, whether
SRCP is Π
p
2 -complete has remained an open problem. The starting
point of the present work is to provide an affirmative answer to
this problem.
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3 STATIC RESILIENCY REVISITED
The first main contribution of this work is the following result:
Theorem 3.1. SRCP is Π
p
2 -hard.
In addition to providing a matching lower bound for Wang and
Li’s upper bound (Theorem 2.12), this result has practical implica-
tions for the choice of solution strategy for SRCP .Π
p
2 -completeness
implies that it is unlikely one can employ SAT -solving technolo-
gies to solve SRCP . One is now driven to employ constraint-solving
technologies that are designed for problems in the second level of
the polynomial hierarchy. As we shall see in §5, one such technol-
ogy is Answer-Set Programming.
Proof. We sketch a polynomial-time Karp reduction from the
Π
p
2 -complete problem,DynamicHamiltonianCircuit (DHC) [26,
36], to SRCP .
Problem: DHC [26]
Instance: A simple graph1 G = (V , E), and an edge set B ⊆ E.
Question: Is it the case that for every D ⊆ B with |D | ≤ |B |/2,
GD has a Hamilton cycle?
Remark: The graphGD is defined to be (V , E \ D).
The proposed reduction takes as input an instance ofDHC , which
consists of a graph G = (V ,E) and a set B ⊆ E. The reduction re-
turns an instance of SRCP consisting of a budget t = |B |/2 and a
workflow authorization policy (S, ,U ,A,C):
(1) S = SV ∪ SE is a set of 2N steps, where N = |V |:
SV = {sv1, sv2, . . . , svN }
SE = {se1, se2, . . . , seN }
These stepsmodel aHamiltonian cycle: each step in SV mod-
els a vertex in the Hamiltonian cycle, and each step in SE
corresponds to an edge in the Hamiltonian cycle.
(2) The partial order  is simply the equality relation (=). In
other words, steps can be executed in any order.
(3) U = UV ∪ UE is the set of users defined as follows:
UV =
⋃
v ∈V
UVv
UE =
⋃
e ∈E
UEe
UVv = {(v, 1), (v, 2), . . . , (v, t + 1)} for v ∈ V (1)
UEe = {(e, 1), (e, 2), . . . , (e, t + 1)} for e ∈ E \ B (2)
UEe = {(e, 1)} for e ∈ B (3)
Intuitively, the users represent vertices and edges in graph
G. A plan, which assigns users to steps, effectively identifies
vertices and edges that participate in the Hamiltonian cycle.
All vertices and those edges not in B have t + 1 copies (see
(1) and (2)). That means the adversary cannot make these
vertices and edges unavailable by removing t users. There
are, however, only one copy of those edges in B (see (3)). The
adversary can prevent these edges from participating in the
Hamiltonian cycle.
1An undirected graph is simple if it contains neither loops nor multi-edges.
(4) The step authorization policy A ensures that users repre-
senting vertices are assigned to steps representing vertices,
and the same for edges.
A = (SV × UV ) ∪ (SE × UE)
(5) The constraint set C = Ccir ∪Cham is made up of two types
of constraint. Intuitively, the constraints in Ccir ensure that
each valid plan identifies a circuit of size N = |V |, while
the constraints in Cham ensure that the identified circuit is
Hamiltonian.
(a) Ccir is a set of type-1 entailment constraints induced
by the binary relation incident. For every edge e ∈ E
connecting vertices u,v ∈ V , define a binary relation
incidente ⊆ U ×U :
incidente = (UEe × UVu ) ∪ (UEe × UVv )
In other words, incidente relates a user representing e to
a user representing one of the two vertices connected by
e . Now, incident is defined as follows:
incident =
⋃
e ∈E
incidente
We also write incident−1 to represent the converse2 of
incident. In short, incident−1 relates a user representing
a vertex to a user representing an edge that has that ver-
tex as one of its two ends. Now, defineCcir = C1∪C2∪C3:
C1 = {ent(incident
−1
, svi , sei ) | 1 ≤ i ≤ N }
C2 = {ent(incident, sei , svi+1) | 1 ≤ i ≤ N − 1}
C3 = {ent(incident, seN , sv1)}
The overall effect of the constraints in Ccir is that a valid
plan identifies a circuit in the graph.
(b) Cham contains type-1 entailment constraints that are spec-
ified using the binary relation distinct ⊆ U ×U :
distinct = {((u, i), (v, j)) ∈ UV × UV | u , v}
Intuitively, two users are related by distinctwhenever they
represent two distinct vertices. Cham can now be defined
as follows:
Cham = {ent(distinct, svi , sv j ) | 1 ≤ i < j ≤ N }
Effectively, Cham ensures that any circuit identified by a
valid plan passes through pairwise distinct vertices: i.e.,
the circuit is a Hamiltonian cycle.
It is obvious that the reduction can be computed in time polyno-
mial to the size of the DHC instance. Observe also the following:
(1) There is a one-to-one correspondence between a valid plan
ofW and a Hamiltonian cycle inG.
(2) For every choice of D ⊆ B with |D | ≤ |B |/2, there is a cor-
responding set of no more than t users from
⋃
e ∈B UEe that
the adversary can remove.
(3) When the adversary removes t users fromU , no more than
t of them belong
⋃
e ∈B UEe . These latter users correspond
to a choice of D ⊆ B with |D | ≤ |B |/2.
Consequently, the input instance (G,B) belongs toDHC if and only
if the output instance (W , t) belongs to SRCP . 
2The converse of R ⊆ X × Y is the relation {(y, x ) ∈ Y × X | (x, y) ∈ R }.
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The reduction above employs only type-1 entailment constraints,
meaning that type-1 entailment is all that is required to drive the
complexity of SRCP to the second level of the polynomial hierar-
chy.
4 ONE-SHOT RESILIENCY
An impression that one may get from reading [39, 40] is that, with
static resiliency as an exception, other notions ofworkflow resiliency
(such as decremental and dynamic resiliency) are largely PSPACE-
complete because of their game-based definition. The goal of this
section is to dispel this false impression. We do so by proposing a
notion of workflow resiliency that is more sophisticated than static
resiliency, and yet remains in the lower levels of the polynomial hi-
erarchy.
4.1 Problem Definition
One-shot resiliency is a generalization of static resiliency and a spe-
cialization of decremental resiliency. Rather than removing users
at the beginning of the game, as in static resiliency, the adversary of
one-shot resiliency may wait till a more opportune time, and then
remove users in the middle of the game. Yet, unlike decremental
resiliency, in which the adversary may “strike” multiple times, the
adversary in one-shot resiliency may only strike at most once.
Definition 4.1 (One-shot Resiliency). A workflow authorization
policyW = (S, ,U ,A,C) is one-shot resilient for integer budget
t ≥ 0 if and only if Player 1 can win the one-shot resiliency game
no matter how Player 2 plays.
The one-shot resiliency game is a two-player game that pro-
ceeds in rounds. At any time, the configuration of the game is a
pair (∆,θ), where ∆ ⊆ U , and θ is a partial plan. Initially, ∆ and θ
are both ∅.
Each round begins by Player 2 opting to either pass or strike,
with the restriction that Player 2 must pass in all future rounds
after it has struck in a round. If Player 2 chooses to strike, then it
further selects no more than t users from U to be placed in ∆. No
action is required of Player 2 if it passes. Next, Player 1 extends θ
by assigning a member ofU \ ∆ to a not-yet-assigned step, so that
θ remains causally closed.
Player 2 wins right away if U \ ∆ = ∅, or if θ becomes invalid.
Player 1 wins if θ is eventually extended to a valid plan.
One-shot resiliency models situations in which the workflow
runs for a moderate length of time (as in decremental resiliency),
but a catastrophe is a truly rare event. The latter either does not
occur, or else it occurs only once. The effect of the catastrophe is
irreversible during the execution of the workflow, as in the cases of
static and decremental resiliency (i.e., removed users do not return
to the game).
We write ORCP to denote the language containing pairs (W , t)
so thatW is one-shot resilient for budget t .
Theorem 4.2. SRCP ⊂ ORCP ⊂ CRCP.
The proof of this theorem is left as an exercise for the reader.
Even though it is defined in terms of a strategic game, one-shot
resiliency remains in the third level of the polynomial hierarchy.
Theorem 4.3. ORCP is Σ
p
3 -complete.
Algorithm 1: A non-deterministic algorithm for deciding
ORCP .
Input: a workflow authorization planW = (S, ,U ,A,C).
Input: an integer budget t ≥ 0.
Output: a boolean value indicating ifW is one-shot resilient
for budget t .
Remarks: This algorithm is equipped with an SRCP oracle.
1 Guess a functional sequence
π = (s1,u1) · (s2,u1) · . . . · (s |S | ,u |S |);
2 if θπ is not a valid plan then return false;
3 W0 ←W ;
4 for i from 1 to |S | do
5 if (Wi−1, t) < SRCP then return false;
6 Wi ← project(Wi−1, si ,ui );
7 return true;
A proof of this result will be given in §4.2 and §4.3. This re-
sult provides the intellectual justification for deciding one-shot re-
siliency through a reduction to first-order Answer-Set Program-
ming with bounded predicate arities (§6)
4.2 Membership in Σ
p
3
We begin the proof of Σ
p
3 -completeness by arguing that ORCP is in
Σ
p
3 . This argument turns out to be anything but trivial, and it sheds
light on the problem structure of ORCP : there is a short encoding
of a winning strategy for Player 1. This insight will be used in our
ASP encoding of ORCP in §6.
SupposeW is a workflow authorization policyW . We construct
a decision tree TW that captures the “moves” of Player 1. A se-
quence τ ∈ (S × U )∗ is functional if and only if no step appears
more than once in τ . Every functional sequence represents a func-
tion θτ that maps steps to users. When θτ is a valid partial plan,
we call τ a play of Player 1. Each play represents a legitimate se-
quence of “moves” that Player 1 can make (without losing). The
decision tree TW is constructed as follows: (a) tree nodes are plays;
(b) a play τ is the parent of another play π whenever π = τ · (s,u)
(i.e., π is obtained from τ by assigning a user to an additional step).
In TW , the empty sequence ϵ is the root of the tree, and a play π
is a descendent of another play τ whenever τ is a prefix of π . A
play τ is called a terminus whenever θτ is a valid plan (i.e., every
step is assigned).W is satisfiable if and only if TW has at least one
terminus.
Suppose t is the budget for Player 2. A strike of Player 2 is a
pair of the form (τ ,∆), where τ is a play, dom(θτ ) , S , ∆ ⊆ U , and
|∆| ≤ t . The play τ is the trigger of the strike. Intuitively, a strike
is a rule that tells Player 2 to remove the users in ∆ immediately
after Player 1 has made the moves in τ . A strike (τ ,∆) invalidates
a terminus π when (a) π is a descendent of τ in TW , and (b) no user
from ∆ is assigned by π after the moves in τ . A strike is successful
if and only if it invalidates every terminus that is a descendent of
its trigger. A set S of successful strikes is a strategy for Player 2 if
the strikes are pairwise independent: two strikes are independent
whenever they have distinct triggers that are not descendents of
each other. The requirement of independence ensures that Player
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2 strikes at most once during a game play. A strategy S of Player 2
is awinning strategy if and only if every terminus of TW is inval-
idated by a strike in S. A strategy S′ subsumes another strategy
S if and only if (a) every terminus that S invalidates is also inval-
idated by S′, and (a) S′ invalidates at least one terminus that S
does not invalidate. A strategy S is maximal if and only if there
it is not subsumed by any other strategy.
SupposeW is one-shot resilient for budget t . Consider a maxi-
mal strategy S for Player 2. Since S cannot be a winning strategy,
there is at least one terminus π that is not invalidated by any strike
in S. Here is the crux of the present argument: No strike can invali-
date π , or else we can construct another strategy S′ that subsumes
S, thereby contradicting the maximality of S. The play π can be
seen as a succinct representation of a winning strategy for Player
1.
Lemma 4.4. (W , t) ∈ ORCP if and only if there is a sequence π of
assignments such that (a) θπ is a valid plan, and (b) for every play τ
that is a prefix of π (i.e., τ is an ancestor of π in TW ), no strike with
trigger τ can be successful.
The idea of Lemma 4.4 can be translated into a non-deterministic
algorithm for deciding ORCP , as depicted in Algorithm 1. The al-
gorithm begins by guessing a play π that corresponds to a valid
plan θπ , and then check that no prefix τ of π can trigger a success-
ful strike. An insight is that this latter check can be achieved by
invoking an SRCP oracle against the “remaining workflow” after
the assignments in τ are committed. This notion of the “remaining
workflow” is formalized in the following definition, which defines
the notation used in line 6.
Definition 4.5. SupposeW = (S, ,U ,A,C) is a workflow au-
thorization policy, and {(s,u)} is a valid partial plan forW . Then
project(W , s,u) is the workflow authorization plan (S ′, ′,U ′,A′,
C ′) such that:
S ′ = S \ {s}
′ = () ∩ (S ′ × S ′)
U ′ = U
A′ = A ∩ (S ′ ×U ′)
and C ′ is defined as follows:
C ′ = {(T ,Θ) | (T ,Θ) ∈ C, s < T } ∪
{(T \ {s},Θ〈s,u〉) | (T ,Θ) ∈ C, s ∈ T , |T | > 1}
where the notation Θ〈s,u〉 is defined below:
Θ〈s,u〉 = {θ \ {(s,u)} | θ ∈ Θ, (s,u) ∈ θ}
Intuitively, Θ〈s,u〉 selects those partial plans in Θ that are consis-
tent with the assignment of u to s , and then eliminates the pair
(s,u) from those selected partial plans.
Since SRCP is Π
p
2 -complete, Algorithm 1 depends on an NP
NP
oracle. In addition, Algorithm 1 runs in non-deterministic polyno-
mial time. Therefore, ORCP belongs to Σ
p
3 .
4.3 Σ
p
3 -hardness
To demonstrate thatORCP is hard for Σ
p
3 , we present a polynomial-
timeKarp reduction from SUCCINCT -k-RADIUS toORCP . The prob-
lem SUCCINCT -k-RADIUS is known to be Σ
p
3 -complete for every
k ≥ 2 [24, 36].
The radius of a directed graphG = (V , E) is the smallest k such
that there exists a vertex u ∈ V such that every vertex v ∈ V is
reachable from u by some directed path of length no greater than
k . (We consider u reachable from itself by a directed path of length
zero.) Deciding ifG has a radius no greater than k is not hard ifG
is represented as, say, an access control matrix or adjacency lists.
What causes the problem to become intractable is whenG is spec-
ified using a succinct representation. In such a representation,
the adjacency matrix of G is specified through a boolean circuit.
Suppose V has a size of 2n for some n ≥ 1, then vertices can be
identified by bit vectors of length n. The adjacency matrix of G
can now be represented by a boolean circuit BCG that takes two
size-n bit vectors ®x and ®y as input, and returns a one-bit value to
indicate if there is a directed edge from vertex ®x to vertex ®y. For-
mulated in this way, deciding if the radius ofG is bounded by k is
Σ
p
3 -complete.
Problem: SUCCINCT -k-RADIUS [24]
Instance: A boolean circuit BCG that succinctly represents a
directed graphG
Question: Is the radius ofG no greater than k?
Given BCG , one can construct a boolean circuit BCreach(®x, ®y; ®z
1
,
®z2, . . . , ®zk−1), which takes k + 1 size-n bit vectors as input, and
returns 1 if and only if vertex ®y is reachable from vertex ®x by a
directed path of length nomore thank , and that directed path visits
intermediate vertices ®z1, ®z2, etc in that order.
BCreach(®x, ®y; ®z
1
, ®z2, . . . , ®zk−1) = BC=(®x, ®y) ∨ BCG (®x, ®y) ∨
BCwalk(®x, ®y; ®z
1) ∨ . . . ∨ BCwalk(®x, ®y; ®z
1
, . . . , ®zk−1)
The circuit BC=(®x, ®y) tests if ®x and ®y are identical bit vectors. The
circuit BCwalk is defined as follows:
BCwalk(®x, ®y; ®z
1
, ®z2, . . . , ®zi ) =
BCG (®x, ®z
1) ∧ BCG (®z
1
, ®z2) ∧ . . . ∧ BCG (®z
i
, ®y)
Note that BCreach has a size that is O(k
2) times the size of BCG .
One can now check ifG has a radius no greater than k by check-
ing the following:
∃®x . ∀®y . ∃®z1, ®z2, . . . , ®zk−1 . BCreach(®x, ®y; ®z
1
, ®z2, . . . ®zk−1) = 1 (4)
Our goal is now to encode (4) using an ORCP instance.
Our reduction takes as input an instance of SUCCINCT -k-RADIUS
consisting of a boolean circuit BCG , where G has 2
n vertices, and
constructs an instance of ORCP consisting of a budget t = n and a
workflow authorization policyW = (S, ,U ,A,C):
(1) The steps in S are “placeholders” for boolean values repre-
senting the input and output bits of BCreach, as well as the
intermediate values computed by the gates in BCreach.
• S = Sx ∪ Sy ∪ Sz ∪ Sgate ∪ Sout .
• Sx = {x1, . . . ,xn } and Sy = {y1, . . . ,yn} contain one step
for each bit of ®x and ®y.
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• Sz = {z
1
1, . . . ,z
1
n , z
2
1, . . . ,z
2
n , . . . ,z
k−1
1 , . . . , z
k−1
n } contains
one step for each bit in ®z1, ®z2, . . . , ®zk−1, for a total of
n × (k − 1) steps.
• Sgate contains one step each gate in BCreach. Intuitively,
these steps represent the output bits of the gates.
• Sout = {out} contains exactly one step representing the
output bit of BCreach.
(2)  orders the steps in Sx first, then Sy , followed by Sz , and
then Sgate , and lastly Sout .
(3) Users represent the two boolean values (true and false). A
plan can thus be interpreted as an assignment of boolean
values to the the input, output, and gates of the boolean cir-
cuit BCreach. Although there are only two boolean values,
there are multiple copies for each.
U = Ubool ∪U⋆
Ubool = U⊥ ∪U⊤
U⊥ = {(⊥, 1), (⊥, 2), . . . , (⊥,n + 1)}
U⊤ = {(⊤, 1), (⊤, 2), . . . , (⊤,n + 1)}
U⋆ = {(f , 1), (t , 2), (f , 3), (t , 4), . . . , (f , 2n − 1), (t , 2n)}
There are two variants of boolean values, the ⊤/⊥-variant
(Ubool ), and the t/f -variant (U⋆). “True” is represented by
⊤- and t-users, and “false” is represented by ⊥- and f -users.
Each boolean value of the ⊤/⊥-variant has n + 1 copies (i.e.,
more than the budget t = n). There are, however, only n
copies of each boolean value of the t/f -variant
(4) The step authorizationpolicyAdescribeswhat type of boolean
values can be assigned to each step.
A = ((Sx ∪ Sz ∪ Sgate) ×Ubool ) ∪
(Sout ×U⊤) ∪ (Sy ×U⋆)
Essentially, boolean values of the ⊤/⊥-variant can be as-
signed to steps representing ®x , ®zi , and the circuit gates. The
output of the entire boolean circuit is forced to be true, as
only ⊤-values can be assigned. Only boolean values of the
t/f -variant can be assigned to steps representing ®y.
(5) C = Corder ∪Cgate ∪Cout contains three types of constraint.:
(a) Constraints inCgate encode the computation performed
by the gates in BCreach. For example, suppose step s ∈
Sgate corresponds to an AND gate, which in turn takes its
two input bits from the output of the gates represented
by steps s1, s2 ∈ Sgate . Then we formulate a constraint
({s, s1, s2},Θand ), so that Θand contains all partial plans θ
such that θ(s) is a user representing “true” if and only if
bothθ(s1) and θ(s2) are users represent “true.” Similar con-
straints can be formulated for OR gates and NOT gates.
(b) Cout contains exactly one type-1 entailment constraint
ent(equal, out, s), where s ∈ Sgate represents the gate that
computes the overall output of BCreach, and equal ⊆ U×U
is a binary relation such that (u1,u2) ∈ equal whenever
u1 and u2 both represent the same boolean value. Since
out ∈ Sout can only be assigned ⊤-users, this constraint
forces BCreach to output “true.”
(c) Corder contains a type-1 entailment constraints ent(order,
yi ,yi+1) for every pair of steps yi ,yi+1 ∈ Sy . The binary
relation order ⊆ U⋆ × U⋆ is defined in such a way that
((b1, j1), (b2, j2)) ∈ order if and only if j1 < j2. These con-
straints forces a linearization of the t/f truth values when
they are assigned to ®y.
The encoding of the boolean circuit BCreach is straightforward to
understand.We explain here how the quantification structure (∃-∀-
∃) of formula (4) is captured by the reduction. There aren+1 copies
of each boolean value of the ⊤/⊥-variant, but the budget of Player
2 is only t = n. No matter which t users are removed by Player 2,
Player 1 can freely assign any boolean values of the⊤/⊥-variant to
the steps representing the bit vectors ®x and ®zi . That is not the case
for ®y. If Player 2 strikes before the steps in Sy are assigned, and it
also removes t = n users of the t/f -variant, then there are only n
such t/f values left to be assigned to the n steps in Sy . In addition,
the constraints in Corder requires that the remaining t/f -users are
assigned to the Sy in “sorted order” of their indices. This means
that the remaining n boolean values of the t/f -variant are now
linearized into a bit vector when they are assigned to ®y. In this way,
Player 2 can dictate the value of ®y. To maximize its control, Player
2 will (a) strike before any of the Sy -steps are assigned, (b) strike
after all the Sx -steps are assigned so as to maximize its knowledge
of ®x , and (c) remove only users from U⋆ (since removing users of
the ⊤/⊥-variant has no effect on the decisions of Player 1). The
overall effect is that Player 1 will first pick ®x , then Player 2 picks
®y, and after that Player 1 picks the ®zi ’s. This captures exactly the
quantification structure of the formula in (4).
Now that we know SRCP and ORCP are respectively complete
problems in the second and third level of the polynomial hierar-
chy, we propose in the following a solution approach for these two
problems.
5 BACKGROUND: ANSWER-SET
PROGRAMMING
Answer-Set Programming (ASP) is a declarative programming par-
adigm [22]. It is essentially Datalog with disjunction and default
negation, defined over a stablemodel semantics. Over the last decades,
ASP implementations have become increasingly competitive in ef-
ficiency. A notable example of a mature ASP implementation is the
Potassco project [33], which is the ASP solver used in this work.
Due to such progress in ASP implementation technologies, reason-
ing tasks at the lower levels of the polynomial hierarchy have now
been regularly encoded in ASP (e.g., [4, 34]). To these computa-
tional problems, ASP plays a role analogous to what SAT is for the
NP-complete problems.
We offer here a brief introduction to the stable model semantics
of propositional ASP. This prepares the reader to understand how
the model saturation technique [20] works in the encodings of
§6.
We begin with the abstract syntax of propositional ASP. An ASP
program P is a finite set of rules. A rule r has the following form:
a1 ∨ . . . ∨ an : -b1, . . . ,bk , notbk+1, . . . , notbm
Here, the ai ’s and bi ’s are atoms (i.e., propositional symbols), and
at most one of m or n can be zero. The head of r , written H (r ),
is the set {a1, . . . , an}, and the body of r is B(r ) = {b1, . . . ,bk ,
notbk+1, . . . , notbm}. We write B
+(r ) for {b1, . . . ,bk }, and B
−(r )
for {bk+1, . . . ,bm}. A rule withm = 0 is a fact (in which case we
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omit the “: -”). A rule with n = 0 is an integrity constraint. Intu-
itively, a rule asserts that one of the head atom holds if the body,
read as a conjunction of literals, holds. A fact asserts a (disjunctive)
condition unconditionally. An integrity constraint asserts that the
body does not hold.
Unlike Prolog, whose semantics is defined procedurally, ASP is
purely declarative. The semantics of ASP is defined in terms of
stable models [23]. An interpretation I of program P is a set of
atoms. I is amodel of P if and only if, for every r ∈ P , H (r ) ∩ I , ∅
whenB+(r ) ⊆ I andB−(r )∩I = ∅. Not every model is stable though.
To arrive at the definition of a stable model, we need to define the
reduct of P relative to I :
P I = {H (r ) : -B+(r ) | r ∈ P , B−(r ) ∩ I = ∅}
An interpretation I is a stable model of P if and only if I is a ⊆-
minimal model of P I . In other words, an I cannot be a stable model
of P if P I has a model I ′ that is a proper subset of I . This require-
ment of minimality is crucial for understanding how the model
saturation technique [20] works in the ASP encodings of §6.
The definition of stable models can be extended to first-order
programs through the use of Hebrand interpretations [19]. The
minimality requirement for the models of the reduct carries to the
first-order case.
Checking the existence of stable models in the presence of dis-
junction and default negation is Σ
p
2 -complete for propositionalASP
[20], and Σ
p
3 -complete for first-order ASP with bounded predicate
arities [19]. The complexity results presented in §3 and §4 grant us
the rational justification for employing ASP technologies to solve
SRCP and ORCP .
6 ASP ENCODING OF SRCP AND ORCP
ASP is a natural constraint solving technology for tackling prob-
lems in the lower levels of the polynomial hierarchy. Solving SRCP
and ORCP using ASP does not require us to assume that t is a
small parameter (an assumptionmade in [10]). This section demon-
strates the feasibility of this solution approach by presenting ASP
encodings of SRCP and ORCP instances.
The presentation below uses the concrete syntax of logic pro-
grams supported by the Potassco collection of ASP solving tools
[33]. We do so to ensure realism: our encoding is literally exe-
cutable. This, however, does not affect the generality of our encod-
ing, as every Potassco-specific syntax employed by our encoding
can be reduced to pure ASP [22, Chapter 2].
In this section, only separation-of-duty constraints are encoded.
The encoding can be extended readily to accommodate binding-
of-duty, cardinality, and entailment constraints [14, 15]. The focus
here is not so much on the encoding of various constraint types in
ASP, but on using ASP to express the quantification structure of
SRCP and ORCP .
6.1 Encoding Static Resiliency
We present an ASP encoding for the complement of SRCP . Given
a workflow authorization policyW = (S, ≤,U ,A,C) and a budget
t ≥ 0, the pair (W , t) belongs to the complement of SRCP if and
only if there exists a subset ∆ of no more than t users such that
every plan that does not assign users from ∆ will fail to satisfyW .
SRCP ORCP Fact
step(s). for each s ∈ S
ignored before(s1, s2). whenever s1 ≺ s2
user(u). for each u ∈ U
auth(s, u). for each (s,u) ∈ A
ignored sod(s1, s2). for each sod(s1, s2) ∈ C
Figure 1: Instance-specific facts used in the ASP encoding
of SRCP and ORCP . The predicate before/2 is ignored in the
SRCP encoding, while sod/2 is ignored in theORCP encoding.
1 % Generate Player 2’s strike
2 { removed(U) : user(U) } t.
3 % Generate Player 1’s assignment
4 avail(S, U) :- auth(S, U), not removed(U).
5 assign(S, U) : avail(S, U) :- step(S).
6 % Test separation-of-duty constraints
7 violation :-
8 sod(S1, S2), assign(S1, U), assign(S2, U).
9 % Model saturation
10 assign(S, U) :- violation, avail(S, U).
11 % Reject unsaturated models
12 :- not violation.
Figure 2: Rules common to all instances in theASP encoding
of SRCP .
In other words, if our ASP encoding is unsatisfiable (has no stable
model), thenW is statically resilient for budget t . Conversely, if
our ASP encoding is satisfiable (has at least one stable model), then
every stable model encodes a subset ∆ of users that can be removed
by the adversarial environment to renderW unsatisfiable.
Our ASP encoding is uniform [22, Chapter 3] in the sense that
every instance of SRCP can be reduced to a logic program P that
can be “factorized” into two parts, a part PC containing rules that
are common to all instances of SRCP , and an instance-specific part
PI , such that P = PC ∪ PI .
Suppose we have been given an SRCP instance consisting of a
workflow authorization policyW = (S, ≤,U ,A,C) and a budget
t ≥ 0. The instance-specific part of the ASP encoding consists of
the facts in Fig. 1, which describe the components S , ≺, U , A, and
C ofW . The rules common to all instances of SRCP are listed in
Fig. 2.
The rules on lines 2, 4, and 5 in Fig. 2 are responsible for gener-
ating interpretations that serve as candidates for stable models.
Line 2 is a choice rule that models the choice of Player 2. Specif-
ically, it generates up to t ground atoms of the remove/2 predicate
in a model candidate. These facts represent the set ∆ of users re-
moved by Player 2.
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Line 4 specifies when a user u is available for assignment to a
step s , given the choice of ∆ by Player 2. Line 5 is a shorthand that
asserts, for each step s , the following disjunction:
assign(s, u1) ∨ . . . ∨ assign(s, um).
where u1, . . . , um are the users identified by predicate avail/2 to
be available for assignment to s .
The cumulating effect of the model generation rules (lines 2, 4,
and 5) is that an interpretation I∆,θ will be generated as a model
candidate for each user set ∆ of size t or less, and for each plan θ
that both complies with the step authorization policy and assigns
only users fromU \∆. Each model candidate I∆,θ contains, on top
of the instance-specific facts in Fig. 1, the following ground atoms:
• removed(u) for each u ∈ ∆
• avail(s, u) whenever u is available for assignment to s
• assign(s, u) whenever θ(s) = u
There are now two cases:
Case 1: θ is valid. Neither lines 7–8 nor line 10 will be “trig-
gered.” But line 12 will reject I∆,θ .
Case 2: θ is not valid. Then lines 7–8 will detect this case, and
introduce the proposition violation into the interpretation
under consideration. Moreover, the interpretation will then
be saturated by line 10: all possible ground atoms of pred-
icate assign/2 will be added to the interpretation. In short,
model candidate I∆,θ will be “converted” to a superset I∆,∗,
which contains, on top of the ground atoms in I∆,θ , the fol-
lowing ground atoms:
• violation
• assign(s, u) for every u available for assignment to s
Suppose (W , t) ∈ SRCP . For every choice of ∆, there exists at
least one valid plan θ0 that does not assign users from ∆. Note that
the model candidate I∆,θ0 will not be saturated, and thus it will
be rejected by line 12. Not only that, the saturated model I∆,∗ is
not a minimal model for P I∆,∗ , because its proper subset I∆,θ0 is
also a model for P I∆,∗ . Consequently, no stable model exists for the
program P .
Conversely, suppose (W , t) < SRCP . Then there is a ∆0 such
that every plan θ that does not assign users from ∆0 is invalid.
This means that Case 1 above never holds for this choice of ∆0.
This also means that every model candidate I∆0,θ is converted into
a saturated model I∆⋆,∗. As none of the interpretations I∆0,θ is a
model for P I∆⋆,∗ , I∆⋆,∗ is the minimal model for P
I∆⋆,∗ . The pro-
gram P has at least one stable model.
We have thus demonstrated that it is feasible to use ASP for en-
coding SRCP . The key is to use an advanced ASP programming
technique known as model saturation [20] to encode the quantifi-
cation structure (i.e., ∃-∀) of SRCP’s complement.We now examine
an extension of this technique for encoding ORCP .
6.2 Encoding One-shot Resiliency
The crux in designing an ASP encoding of ORCP lies in capturing
the quantification structure of Σ
p
3 (i.e., ∃-∀-∃). To this end, we em-
ploy the advanced adaption of model saturation as found in the
proof of Lemma 6 and Lemma 7 in [19].
1: % Generate a plan as part of Player 1’s strategy
2: 1 { assign(S, U) : auth(S, U) } 1 :- step(S).
3: % Generate a total ordering of steps as part of
4: % Player 1’s strategy
5: order(X, Y); order(Y, X) :-
6: step(X), step(Y), X != Y.
7: order(X, Y) :- before(X, Y).
8: order(X, Z) :- order(X, Y), order(Y, Z).
9: % Generate strike point of Player 2
10: post(S); pre(S) :- step(S).
11: post(S2) :- post(S1), order(S1, S2).
12: % Generate strike set of Player 2
13: removed(U); preserved(U) :- user(U).
14: % Available assignments for Player 1
15: avail(S, U) :- pre(S), assign(S, U).
16: avail(S, U) :- post(S), auth(S, U), preserved(U).
17: % Detect satisfiability
18: sat :-
19: avail(1, U1), avail(2, U2), . . ., avail(9, U9),
20: U2 != U7, U3 != U4, . . ., U8 != U9.
21: % Player 2 loses if it removes more than t users
22: sat :- t+1 { removed(U) : user(U) }.
23: % Model saturation
24: pre(S) :- sat, step(S).
25: post(S) :- sat, step(S).
26: removed(U) :- sat, user(U).
27: preserved(U) :- sat, user(U).
28: avail(S, U) :- sat, auth(S, U).
29: % Reject unsaturated models
30: :- not sat.
Figure 3: ASP encoding of ORCP . Note that the rule on lines
18–20 are instance specific. This encoding also assumes the
instance-specific facts in Fig. 1.
Unlike the encoding in §6.1, the ASP encoding of ORCP pre-
sented here is not uniform. It cannot be factorized into an instance-
specific set of facts and a set of of rules that are common to all
instances. More specifically, ORCP is encoded using the instance-
specific facts in Fig. 1 and the rules in Fig. 3. Note that lines 18–20
of Fig. 3 are only examples. Each ORCP instance will have a differ-
ent formulation of those lines, depending on what constraints are
in C .
Our ASP encoding of ORCP basically follows the idea of Lemma
4.4, and thus Fig. 3 could be seen as an ASP variant of Algorithm
1:
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(1) The logic program “guesses” a functional sequence τ that
encodes the strategy of Player 1.
(2) Then model saturation is employed for capturing the uni-
versal quantification of Player 2’s strikes.
(3) Lastly, testing whether a prefix π of τ can be extended to a
terminus is performed without model generation rules.
Generating Player 1’s strategy. The first part of Player 1’s strat-
egy is a plan, which is represented by the predicate assign/2. Us-
ing a choice rule, line 2 generates, for each step s , exactly one fact
of the form assign(s, u) if user u is authorized to execute step s .
The second part of Player 1’s strategy is a total ordering of steps.
This is represented by the predicate order/2, which is generated
by lines 5–8. More specifically, lines 5–6 generate, for every pair
of distinct steps X and Y , either order(X, Y) or order(Y, X).
Line 7 ensures that the generated ordering honors the ordering
constraints of the workflow, and line 8 ensures transitivity.
Generating Player 2’s strike. The strike of Player 2 is generated
by lines 9–13. There are two parts to the strike. The first part is a
subset ∆ of users to be removed. Line 13 is a shorthand that asserts,
for each user u , the disjunction below:
removed(u) ∨ preserved(u).
The alert reader will notice that no constraint on the size of ∆ is
placed here. As we shall see, the size is controlled by having Player
2 loses the game if it picks more than t users in ∆ (see line 22).
The second part of Player 2’s strike is the choice of a round to
launch the strike. This choice is generated by lines 10–11. More
specifically, every step is labelled as either “pre-strike” or “post-
strike” by line 10. A pre-strike step is one that is ordered before
the launch point according to the total ordering chosen by Player
1 above; otherwise, the step is post-strike. Line 11 ensures that post-
strike steps are never ordered before pre-strike steps.
Testing if a prefix of Player 1’s strategy can be extended to a termi-
nus. Lines 14–20 check whether, after the strike chosen by Player
2, the assignments made prior to the strike by Player 1 can be ex-
tended to a valid plan. This section can be further divided into two
subsections: (a) lines 15–16, and (b) lines 18–20.
Lines 15–16 determine which user s is available for assignment
to which step s after the strike. For pre-strike steps, the assignment
is fixed according to Player 1’s strategy (line 15). For post-strike
steps, authorized users who have not been removed by the strike
are available (line 16).
Then comes lines 18–20, which mark the interpretation by the
marker proposition sat whenever the workflow authorization pol-
icy is found to be satisfiable (given Player 1’s strategy and Player
2’s strike). This is the part of the encoding that has been inspired
by the proof of Lemma 7 in [19]. The main feature of this sec-
tion is that satisfiability is checked withoutmodel generation rules
(e.g., choice rules and disjunctive rules). Instead, a single rule is
used. This rule, however, is instance specific: a different rule of this
form will have to be formulated for each ORCP instance. The rule
considers all possible user assignments to the steps (line 19), and
then checks the SOD constraints inline (line 20). By encoding the
nested existential quantification without model generation rules,
we can reuse the model saturation technique to encode the outer
existential-universal quantifications.
Other mechanics. Line 22 ensures that Player 2 plays according
to the budget. If Player 2 removes more than t users, then Player 1
wins: i.e., the workflow authorization policy is considered satisfied.
If the workflow authorization policy is satisfiable (i.e., the propo-
sition sat is part of the model), then lines 24–28 will saturate the
model by producing all possible ground atoms that can ever be
asserted as a result of Player 2’s choice. Finally, line 30 rejects un-
saturated models. Using an argument analogous to the one in §6.1,
one can demonstrate that a stable model exists if and only if Player
1 has a winning strategy.
7 RELATED WORK
The notion of resiliency was introduced into the study of access
control by Li et al., originally in the context of RBAC rather than
in workflow authorization models [27, 28]. Significant recent ad-
vances have been achieved in employing parameterized complex-
ity analysis to facilitate the design of efficient algorithms for the
Resiliency Checking Problem (RCP) [13]. In particular, the efficient
FPT algorithms designed for WSP is employed as subroutines for
solving RCP. There is also interest in formulating “resiliency”-variants
of combinatorial problems in general [11]. A form of resiliency
checking problem has also been defined for Relationship-Based
Access Control (ReBAC), in the context of policy negotiation per-
formed among co-owners of the a resource [32]. ReBAC resiliency
checkingwas shown to be complete forΠ
p
2 . That result, however, is
significantly different from Theorem 3.1 of the present paper. First,
ReBAC resiliency is about an adversary who can remove relation-
ship edges in an underlying social graph, whereas the adversary
of workflow resiliency removes users. Second, the hardness proof
of [32] involves a reduction from the Graph Consistency problem,
and is therefore fundamentally different from the one presented in
this paper. In general, the nature of RCP is different fromworkflow
resiliency, as the latter contains an element of dynamism, allowing
the adversarial environment to remove users as the workflow is ex-
ecuting.
The idea of workflow resiliency was first introduced by Wang
and Li [39, 40]. The present paper bridges the complexity gap of
static resiliency that existed since the first conception of the idea
a decade ago.
Two notable lines of recent research explore new directions in
the study of workflow resiliency. Mace et al. [29–31] pointed out
that simply knowing whether a workflow is resilient or not is not
sufficient. The real interest of the workflow developer is to receive
feedback from the policy analysis in order to repair the workflow.
They proposed a quantitative model of resiliency in response to
this need. The idea is to build a probabilistic adversary model, and
then formulate a Markov Decision Process to capture how users
are removed over time. While the insight of their perspective is ac-
knowledged, it is the position of this paper that multiple notions
of resiliency are needed in order to provide insights into the work-
flow engineering process. The proposal of one-shot resiliency is
partly motivated by this consideration.
A second recent work on workflow resiliency is the FPT algo-
rithm of Crampton et al. for deciding dynamic resiliency [10]. Un-
fortunately, the parameter they used involves the budget t of the
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adversary, which is not universally considered small. It is there-
fore necessary to consider solution approaches that do not assume
a small t . The proposal of ASP as a solution approaches for static
and one-shot resiliency in the present work is a response to this
challenge.
Kahn and Fong proposedworkflow feasibility as a dual notion
of workflow resiliency [25]. The idea is based whether the current
protection state can be repaired to make the workflow satisfiable.
Feasibility checking is also defined for ReBAC [32], and shown to
be complete for Σ
p
2 .
8 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We proved that static resiliency is complete forΠ
p
2 , thereby solving
a problem that has been open for more than a decade since Wang
and Li first proposed the notion of workflow resiliency [39, 40].
We have also demonstrated that useful notions of workflow re-
siliency need not be PSPACE-hard. The fact that we can define a
notion of workflow resiliency (one-shot resiliency) that remains in
the lower levels of the polynomial hierarchy (Σ
p
3 ) implies that the
lower complexity of static resiliency is not an exception.
The completeness of SRCP and ORCP in the second and third
level of the polynomial hierarchy also suggests that Answer-Set
Programming is a natural choice of constraint-solving technology
for solving the two problems (without having to assume that t is a
small parameter). We have demonstrated the feasibility of this ap-
proach by presenting ASP encodings of SRCP and ORCP . These en-
codings involve the application of the model saturation technique
[20] and its advanced adaptation [19].
A number of research directions are suggested below:
(1) It is unlikely that the ASP encodings of SRCP and ORCP
presented in §6 are the most efficient ones. Since the encod-
ings are formulated mainly for demonstration of feasibility,
they are optimized for brevity. It is well-known that the ef-
ficiency of ASP programs can benefit from advanced opti-
mization techniques [22]. A natural follow-up work is to ex-
plore these optimization techniques, and empirically bench-
mark the performance of ASP-based solutions for SRCP and
ORCP . A promising direction is to combine the pattern-based
technique of [5, 6] with ASP-solving.
(2) The proposal of ORCP affirms the possibility for defining
alternative notions of workflow resiliency beyond the three
advanced byWang and Li.ORCP not only avoids thePSPACE-
completeness of CRCP and DRCP , but also admits encoding
in first-order ASP with bounded predicate arities. An inter-
esting research direction is to explore if there are other use-
ful formulations of workflow resiliency that also reside in
the lower levels of the polynomial hierarchy.
(3) The source of complexity for PSPACE-complete notions of
workflow resiliency (i.e., CRCP and DRCP ) is that the adver-
sary model is overly powerful. An open question is whether
there are alternative adversarymodels forworkflow resiliency
that involve a less powerful adversary and still lead to use-
ful notions of availability for workflow authorization mod-
els. (In some sense, the quantitative model of Mace et al.
could be seen as an alternative adversary model [29–31].)
The existing adversary model is framed in terms of a bud-
get t , and a flexible consumption schedule of this budget.
Alternative adversary models can envision a different way
in which the adversarial environment interacts with work-
flow execution. Consider, for example, a small-accidents
variant of decremental resiliency, in which at most one user
may be removed in each round. The assumption that k + t
is small now makes a lot of sense in this adversary model,
and the FPT algorithm of [10] is genuinely reasonable in
this model. Creative deviation from the adversary model of
Wang and Li is therefore a promising research direction.
(4) FPT-reductions to SAT may be possible for some notions of
workflow resiliency. It is now a standard problem-solving
technique to seek FPT reductions of hard problems to SAT ,
so as to exploit the efficiency of SAT -solving technologies
[17, 18]. Bounded Model Checking is often cited as an exam-
ple of this approach. An even more general approach is to
consider FPT algorithms that query a SAT -solver multiple
times (i.e., FPT Turing reductions) [16]. An open question
is whether static and one-shot resiliency can be solved via
FPT reductions to SAT , and if not, whether there are other
useful notions of workflow resiliency that can be solved in
this way.
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